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Tim Crane’s The Objects of Thought is, I think, a much needed cor-
rective to standard ways that analytic philosophers think about non-
existence. It starts from our common sense thought and talk, and 
tries to carve out a position that can defend this starting point in the 
face of criticism. It is well-written, a pleasure to read, and largely 
clear. I would recommend it to anyone interested in the problems of 
nonexistence. In §1 I sketch Crane’s central ideas about the nonexis-
tent, before turning to themes that I would like to have heard more 
about. In §2, I distinguish two problems of nonexistence, showing 
that whilst Crane solves one, he does not address the other. Although 
Crane did not seek to address both problems, I think we should rec-
ognize that there is this residual problem of nonexistence remaining. 
Next (§3), I argue that whilst Crane is correct to think that a nega-
tive free logic has to be rejected if we construe it as making a claim 
about grammatical subject-predicate sentences, we might be able to 
salvage it if we recognise a class of logical predicates. But whether 
this is possible or not, depends on the solution to the unaddressed 
problem of nonexistence. In the final two sections I briefly raise a 
concern about Crane’s view of quantification, before making a sug-
gestion about how his view might be employed in addressing Geach’s 
problem of intentional identity.
1 Crane’s approach
Some of the things we think about exist, like Buda Castle, but some 
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of the things we think about, like Hogwarts, do not. Hence there 
are truths about the nonexistent, such as Lee is thinking about Hog-
warts. And yet the world does not contain more than what exists. 
Tim Crane’s task is to defend and reconcile these apparently con-
flicting common sense claims.
But wait, you might think. Do we really think about the nonex-
istent? Surely, if I am thinking about something, there must really 
be something for my thought to be about. Thinking about is, so the 
objection goes, what Crane calls a ‘real’ or ‘substantial’ relation, and 
so entails its relata. Certainly this suggestion is not without merit, 
and even those friendly to providing accounts of empty names, such 
as Mark Sainsbury (2005: 237-238), have denied that we do think 
about the nonexistent. Still, Crane is correct that our thoughts are 
characterized in certain ways, even when there is nothing in reality 
that we are thinking of, and it seems that the English word ‘about’ is 
as good a way as any to capture this phenomena. So, just as there can 
be drawings and sculptures of Peter Pan, there can be thoughts about 
him too. Crane does, however, recognize that there is a real relation 
in area, and he reserves the word ‘reference’ for this relation: one 
can think or talk about Peter Pan, but one cannot refer to him.
I am thinking about Peter Pan; Peter Pan does not exist; there-
fore, some of the things I am thinking about do not exist. So as well 
as thinking and talking about the nonexistent, we can also quantify 
“over” them. It seems to be part of the data that some of the things 
we think about do not exist. Moreover, for Crane, so-called exis-
tential readings of ‘there is’ sentences are semantically equivalent 
to their corresponding ‘some’ sentences. This is because ‘there’ is a 
semantically vacuous term, present simply because syntax requires 
it. So, there are things we think about that do not exist. But this is not 
an ontological claim, since, for Crane, nonexistents are no part of 
reality in any sense. Rather, it “is simply another way of saying that 
we can genuinely think about things that don’t exist” (2003: 5).
Crane’s view is, then, something of a hybrid. It resembles a posi-
tive free logic in that it allows for true seemingly simple sentences 
containing non-referring terms, but it is Meinongian in that its un-
restricted quantifiers range “over” nonexistents: in free logics tra-
ditionally conceived, the quantifiers range over only existents, and 
traditional Meinongian pictures allow for reference to nonexistents. 
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In this way, Crane’s picture is an improvement on these rival views. 
It seems to be a fact about English that there are true generalizations 
about nonexistents, and I myself cannot make sense of a picture on 
which we refer to, as opposed to talk about, the nonexistent, since 
there are not really any.
Crane, following standard usage, reserves the symbols ∃ and ∀ 
for quantifying over the existents. Because Crane allows for mean-
ingful empty names, these quantifiers are subject to a free logic, and 
so the rules for existential generalization and universal instantiation 
need to be restricted to cases in which ∃x (x=a). But as we have 
seen, Crane does not think the English word ‘some’ corresponds to ∃. Rather than ‘some’ expressing the existential quantifier, Crane 
could have followed others in saying that it expresses a particular 
quantifier, Σ, and that ‘all’ has a corresponding reading, Π, that 
ranges “over” both nonexistents and existents. These quantifiers be-
have classically with unrestricted particular generalization and uni-
versal instantiation, and so allow for the move from ‘I am thinking 
about Peter Pan’ to ‘Σx Lee is thinking about x’.
Despite sharing some features with other forms of neo-Meinon-
gianism, Crane’s view differs sharply in that he rejects any form of 
characterization principle along the following lines
CP: Nonexistents are the way they are characterized as being by 
the appropriate myth, theory, fiction, etc.
Moreover, he differs from some positive free logicians in that he de-
nies that nonexistents can have any ordinary properties such as be-
ing a horse, being a detective, or being located in space. For Crane, 
these are existence entailing properties, and so cannot be had by 
nonexistents.
So what truths concerning the nonexistent does Crane allow for? 
For Crane these fall in to three categories. First, there are negative 
existential claims such as Hogwarts does not exist. Second, there are 
representation-dependent truths, examples include being thought 
about, being famous, and being a fictional character. Third, Crane 
allows for the truth of trivial identity statements, such as Peter Pan 
is Peter Pan (although how to spell-out what a trivial identity state-
ment is is not itself trivial (2013: 165)). Crane’s task is to provide an 
account of how these statements about the nonexistent can be true 
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given that the nonexistent are no part of reality.
Crane offers a “metaphysical reduction” of these claims about the 
nonexistent, providing truth makers for these truths, in his non-
committal, not theoretically-loaded sense of this phrase. But unlike 
neo-Meinongians, he wants to do this without metaphysical extrava-
gance, and so eschews appeals to Meinongian object theory with its 
reliance on impossible worlds, the distinction between nuclear and 
extra-nuclear properties, or between encoding and instantiating. So 
how exactly does Crane account for the truths above?
First, nonexistence claims are made true simply in virtue of the 
fact that the world does not contain nonexistents. As Crane puts it, 
“the falsity of ‘Vulcan exists’ is ensured by the fact that reality ... 
does not contain Vulcan” (2013: 119); there is no truth maker for 
‘Vulcan exists’. So given that ‘Vulcan exists’ is false, its negation is 
true. And as Crane notes (2013: 73), this negation is expressed by 
‘Vulcan does not exist’.
Second, representation-dependent truths are true, as the name 
suggests, in virtue of the existence of some representation, whether 
this is a story, a theory, or an episode of thinking. So, for instance, 
‘Vulcan was a planet postulated by Le Verrier’ is true iff there was 
an event where Le Verrier represented Vulcan as a planet in certain 
way (2013: 135).
Third, self-identity claims follow from the “logical truth that for 
all x, x=x” (2013: 165), where this must be understood as Πx x=x, 
if it is to yield, say, that Vulcan=Vulcan by universal instantiation. 
But why think Πx x=x is a logical truth? Well, in classical systems 
it follows from the rule for introducing identity, a=a, by universal 
introduction. But whether a=a is a logical truth is precisely what is at 
issue, so Crane cannot appeal to this to justify his claim. So I think 
that Crane has not provided any independent reason for us to ac-
cept that nonexistents are in fact self-identical. Moreover, there does 
not seem to be anything in the world to ground these self-identity 
claims; ‘Vulcan=Vulcan’ has no truth maker as Crane admits (2013: 
163). I think it would be simpler and more in keeping with Crane’s 
project to deny that these claims are in fact true.
Apart from the three types of truth about the nonexistent that 
Crane explicitly discusses, we should also count as true negative 
claims made with any existence entailing properties, not just negative 
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existentials: if it is true that Vulcan does not exist, given the absence 
of Vulcan, then it is also true than Vulcan is not a planet, since being 
a planet is existence entailing. Finally, Crane might want to consider 
which modal claims concerning nonexistents are true. Perhaps Vul-
can could not have existed? If so, perhaps some modal claims are also 
existence entailing, and so can be subsumed by the previous point.
Despite what many philosophers have said about quantification 
and empty names, Crane’s general picture above seems dead right to 
me. It is, I think, on the basis of theoretical considerations that have 
not been adequately justified, that some resist this intuitive picture. 
So Crane is to be applauded for spelling-out this common sense pic-
ture of the nonexistent, and rejecting philosophical orthodoxy. And 
yet, some will not be completely satisfied with Crane’s solution.
2 The problems of nonexistence
Crane states the problem of nonexistence as follows: “if truth is su-
pervenient on being, then how can one truly say of something that is 
not—something that has no being—that it is a certain way? How 
can such a claim be true?” (2003: 20). It is not entirely clear what 
the tension is supposed to be here. After all, does anyone think that 
there are possible worlds where the existence facts are the same, 
but the truths about nonexistents differ? Supervenience is not really 
the issue here, I think. For Crane, the issue is better put in terms 
of truth making. The problem of nonexistence, as Crane thinks of 
it, is that given that nonexistents are not a part of reality, what are 
the truth makers for statements about them? As Crane himself puts 
it, “Given that when something is true, it is reality that makes it so, 
we are obliged to ask: what in reality makes these claims about the 
non-existent true?” (2013: 118). As we saw above, Crane sets out to 
answer this question, and his answer seems on the right lines to me.
But is this enough? Crane describes his reductionism as providing 
an explanation of the truth of statements about the nonexistent with-
out giving the meaning of those statements. We might, however, also 
want an account of the meaning of such statements. The residual 
problem of the nonexistent, unaddressed by Crane, is how to provide 
systematic truth conditions for claims about the nonexistent, with-
out appealing to reference to nonexistents.
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Now Crane can be forgiven for not engaging in this no doubt dif-
ficult, and largely technical semantic project. It is fine for there to be 
a division of philosophical labour, and Crane’s positive picture was 
well worth setting-out as a much needed alternative to more extrava-
gant approaches. Still, there is this residual problem, and until this 
problem has been solved, Crane’s extravagant opponents, at least, 
will view his approach with suspicion.
A related worry comes from asking how Crane thinks we should 
decide ontological questions? He says that what people are in fact 
committed to is a matter of what they believe in, rather than what 
they quantify over. Fair enough. But we can ask what ought they, 
objectively, believe in. How do we settle that question? Crane does 
not think that there is an informative formal criterion of which ob-
ject-language sentences are ontologically committing (see below). So 
perhaps he thinks ontological commitment is determined by which 
entities are appealed to in the metalanguage when giving the seman-
tics of the object-language. But Crane, as we have seen, does not 
provide such a semantics. His opponents may suspect that once he 
does provide a semantics he will find himself faced with the same 
extravagant choices he criticizes.
As well as Crane’s truth maker conception of the problem of non-
existence, then, there is another problem that we can characterize 
with the following inconsistent triad (I do not say these two prob-
lems exhaust the problems of nonexistence):
(1) There are true subject-predicate sentences about nonexis-
tents.
(2) If a subject-predicate sentence ‘a is F’ is true, then ‘a’ refers.
(3) At least one subject term in a subject-predicate sentence 
about nonexistents lacks a referent.
Crane, effectively, takes (3) to be a constraint on the solution, and 
I agree. He also takes (1) to be constitutive of the problem, so, he 
rejects (2). But (2) follows from the simple view of truth
SVT: A predicative sentence, ‘a is F’ is true iff the object denoted 
by ‘a’ has the property ascribed by ‘F’.
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And so as Crane rejects (2), he also rejects SVT. But he does not pro-
vide a systematic alternative to SVT, which leaves open the questions 
just raised. In the next section, I sketch some thoughts on Crane’s 
account of properties and predicates, and a different way of thinking 
that is nonetheless consonant with his whole approach.
3 Properties and predicates
Crane claims that there are true subject-predicate sentences about 
the nonexistent. Moreover, he says that these sentences are true be-
cause the nonexistent the sentence is about has the property ascribed 
by the predicate. Does this, then, not allow him to answer the chal-
lenge faced above? As Crane notes, on his view “The truth-condi-
tions for a claim of the form ‘a is F’ is that it is true just in case a has 
the property F. We can state the truth-conditions in this form, in the 
same way, whether or not ‘a’ refers to anything” (2013: 58).
Here it might look like Crane is going some way to providing the 
systematic theory I asked for. This impression is, I think, illusory 
(not that Crane claims otherwise) since the properties that nonexis-
tents have are, for Crane, “pleonastic”, the result of the grammati-
cal transformations from ‘a is F’, to ‘there is a property that a has, 
namely Fness’. As a result, to say that ‘a is F’ is true just in case a has 
the property F is not to provide an explanation of why ‘a is F’ is true. 
They are simply two ways of saying the same thing.
Now one way of holding on to SVT, but allowing for truths about 
the nonexistent, is to adopt a negative free logic that supplements 
SVT with
NFL: If ‘a’ does not refer, then any subject-predicate sentence, ‘a 
is F’ is false.
With NFL we can account for the falsity of all of the existence en-
tailing claims concerning nonexistents, and thus for the truth of 
their negations, including negative existentials. But although NFL 
is consistent with their being truths about nonexistents, it does not 
allow for true subject-predicate claims about the nonexistent, and 
so it resolves the residual problem of nonexistence by rejecting (1). 
Although Crane would be happy to accept this approach for a range 
of sentences, he rejects it in its full generality, since he thinks that 
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it cannot provide a satisfactory account of representation-dependent 
truths. In brief, this is because Crane thinks that not all of these 
truths can be accounted for by employing intensional operators tak-
ing subject-predicate sentences within their scope. Rather, Crane 
thinks that there are true representation-dependent, subject-pred-
icate sentences concerning nonexistents, and so NFL has to be re-
jected.
Crane thinks that there are true predications concerning non-
existents because he follows Dummett (1973: 37-38) in saying that 
a predicate is what results when we remove one or more referring 
expressions from a sentence. There are at least three worries that 
we might raise for this conception. First, one might want to exclude 
certain complex sentences from this method of predicate formation, 
otherwise we can have what appear to be incompatible predicates 
true of the same object. For instance, Frege’s puzzle might give rise 
to the predicates ‘Lee believes that x is F’ and ‘Lee does not believe 
that x is F’ (as opposed to ‘Lee believes x is not F’). Second, even ig-
noring complex sentences, this method might be objected to because 
it allows for a predicate ‘Professor x was an expert on Tarot’ to be 
generated by removing ‘Dummett’ from ‘Professor Dummett was 
an expert on tarot’. But it does not make any sense to predicate this 
of an object, as can be seen by completing the predicate with some 
other phrase that picks out Dummett, such as ‘the Wykeham Pro-
fessor of Logic in 1985’. This problem could be avoided, however, 
by placing a suitable restriction on what counts as a referring term 
in the relevant sense. But even leaving all this to one side, there is a 
third problem which is brought out by considering Quine’s (1960: 
153) example of
(4) Giorgione was so-called because of his size.
By the Dummett method of predicate formation, this yields the 
predicate
(5) x was so-called because of his size.
But it is odd to say that (5) is a predicate. First, it does not allow for 
substitution of co-referring terms, even when we concern ourselves 
with de re readings. For it is not true that
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(6) Barbarelli is such that he was so-called because of his size.
Relatedly, one cannot quantify into this predicate since neither
(7) ∃x (x was so-called because of his size)
(8) Σx (x was so-called because of his size)
make sense. But it seems to me that the notion of a predicate is tied 
as much to quantification as it is to combining with singular terms.
The real predicate involved in (4) is more perspicuously given by
(9) x was called ‘Giorgione’ because of his size
and (9) is not subject to the problems above.
Moreover, (4) puts pressure on the notion of a pleonastic prop-
erty, since we cannot move from (4) to
(10) There is a property Giorgione has, namely so-called because 
of his sizeness.
What this shows, then, is that it is not as harmless as Crane suggests 
to think of true claims concerning nonexistents as true subject-pred-
icate claims where the nonexistent has a pleonastic property cor-
responding to the predicate. The point of this is to bring out that as 
well as Dummett’s grammatical notion, we also have the separate 
notion of a logical predicate. And it is the logical notion, I suggest, 
that is important to the assessment of NFL. Crane rejects NFL be-
cause
The mere idea of a sentence free of truth-functional operators, and of 
‘intensional’ operators ... is clear enough, but [examples like ‘Vulcan 
was a planet postulated by Le Verrier’] show that these restrictions do 
not on their own determine a kind of expression which always deter-
mines a falsehood when combined with a non-referring term. There 
does not seem to be a syntactic or formal criterion of simplicity [for a 
predicate in NFL’s sense] (2013: 55).
Now I think the negative free logician has more formal resources 
than Crane considers. For one thing, the passive versions of repre-
sentation-dependent truths often sound much worse than the active 
forms: compare ‘Le Verrier is thinking about Vulcan’ with ‘Vulcan is 
being thought about by Le Verrier’. But not all do, and it is not clear 
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that there is surface-form syntactic criterion of a logical predicate. 
Still, it might be correct that there is an interesting class of expres-
sions, logical predicates, that when combined with an empty name, 
always produce a falsehood, but that this class cannot be read-off 
surface structure. The only way to discover if this is true is by doing 
the semantics and discovering the logical forms of the problematic 
sentences. If there is a class of logical predicates that combine with 
empty names to produce false sentences, then perhaps the thought 
behind NFL is vindicated. Further, these logical forms would cor-
respond to the existence entailing properties, and so we would have 
an explanation of which properties are existence entailing.
What about the representation-dependent truths? If these are not 
logical predications, what are they? It seems to me that what (many 
of) these truths are doing is not ascribing a property to, or predi-
cating something of a nonexistent, in some intuitive sense that has 
not been made precise. Rather, they are characterizing representations 
as Peter Pan-sculptures, Vulcan-theories, Holmes-stories, Pegasus-
thoughts, etc. Whether, ultimately, this approach can be sustained 
to defend NFL is not clear, but it is only by investigating the logical 
forms of sentences that we can find out. In any case, this approach, 
which takes characterizing as primitive (see Forbes 2006) seems to 
fit well with Crane’s (2013: 90) proposal to take intentionality as 
primitive.
Regardless of the logical forms of claims about the nonexistent, 
Crane is right to reject NFL as a claim about (surface) syntactically 
simple sentences. But by investigating why it is false read as such, by 
seeking to provide a systematic semantics for the nonexistent, we 
open up the possibility of drawing some worthwhile logical distinc-
tions between sentences that are genuinely ascribing properties of 
their subjects and those that are not, and between claims that entail 
the existence of their subjects, and those that do not. Consequently, 
we might be able to ward off the suspicions of some of Crane’s op-
ponents, and maintain the possibility of doing ontology in something 
like the Fregean tradition. All of this goes beyond what Crane sought 
to do in his book. And as I have said, I think that his general picture 
and metaphysical reduction must be correct. Still, I think some in-
vestigation of these issues would have been interesting.
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4 Quantification
Crane, as we saw allows for quantification “over” nonexistents. I have 
repeatedly used scare quotes because it was not entirely clear to me 
what Crane’s account amounts to exactly. Crane says that he wants 
to keep “the basic ideas of the logic of quantification intact” (2013: 
31). So what, then, does it mean to quantify “over” nonexistents for 
Crane?
It is to have non-existent objects of thought in the universe of discourse, 
where ... to have an object of thought in the universe of discourse is to 
have it among the things relevant to what we are talking about ... These 
things can be ‘values’ of the variables bound by the quantifiers, just in 
the sense that things can be true or false of the objects of thought. So, 
when evaluating ‘some biblical characters did not exist’ we look for 
something in the domain (biblical characters) of which we can predi-
cate non-existence. And lo! We find one: Abraham. Abraham is then a 
value of the variable (2013: 40).
Note how Crane himself uses scare quotes for ‘values’. If Crane wants 
to say that we can quantify over nonexistents in the way in which 
standard logic quantifiers over a domain of existents, then I would 
like to have seen more detail about assignment functions, satisfac-
tion, and the like to help me fully understand what was going on. 
But it seems to me that Crane does not need to go down this route, 
since, at other points, his account of quantification does not appear 
to amount to quantifying over nonexistents. Rather, it seems to be a 
device of generalizing into certain syntactic positions:
After all, if we can use a name to talk of something which does not ex-
ist, then the quantifier ‘some’ is just a generalization from the use of a 
name (2013: 16).
quantified sentences [such as] ... ‘Some characters in the Bible did not 
exist’—are best understood as generalizations from sentences that 
predicate something of their subjects (2013: 119).
I would have liked to have heard more about whether this kind of syn-
tactic generalization was what Crane had in mind, and also how his 
approach compares with others who have adopted such approaches.
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5 De re thought
After setting out his metaphysical picture, Crane (2013, chapter 6) 
turns to the problem of thinking about specific nonexistents. There 
is too much in this chapter to cover, so I shall just focus on his discus-
sion of de re thought. Here, as is standard, Crane construes the de 
re/de dicto distinction syntactically, so that quantifying into a belief 
report, say, counts as de re.
After noting that singular thoughts can be attributed de dicto, 
Crane considers whether singular thought entails a de re attribution. 
Crane notes that whereas on the orthodox conception, this is true, 
since ‘S believes that ... a ...’ entails ‘∃x (S believes ... of x)’, no 
such entailment is forthcoming on Crane’s account, since we can be-
lieve things about the nonexistent. Rather than take this as counting 
against singular thought about the nonexistent, Crane instead rejects 
the idea that singular thought entails de re attribution.
Now clearly Crane is correct that beliefs about the nonexistent do 
not license existential generalization. And so if existential generaliza-
tion is required for the de re, then singular thought about the non-
existent does not entail a de re reading. But why think that existential 
quantification is required? The syntactic construal of the de re does 
not mention existential quantification. Moreover, given that Crane 
employs something like a particular quantifier that quantifies “over” 
nonexistents, he is free to acknowledge de re attributions of belief 
concerning nonexistents. For example, Σx such that Crane believes 
x does not exist.
Two options present themselves. First, Crane could accept that 
singular thought, even about the nonexistent, does entail a de re at-
tribution, albeit one in terms of the particular, rather than the exis-
tential, quantifier. Second, he could reject the syntactic criterion of 
the de re given above, in favour of a relational construal of the de re. 
This seems to fit better with Crane’s way of thinking since he glosses 
‘de re’ at several points as ‘relational’, where I take him to mean sub-
stantially relational. If this is right, then there is no purely syntactic 
characterization of the de re for Crane, just as there is no syntactic 
construal of the ontologically committing claims.
But having pulled apart the syntactic and relational construals of 
‘de re’, it seems as if Crane is in a position to provide an irrealist 
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construal of the problematic Geach sentence concerning intentional 
identity:
(11) Hob thinks a witch blighted Bob’s mare, and Nob wonders 
whether she (the same witch) killed Cob’s sow.
It has been thought that (11) cries out for a syntactically de re read-
ing. But on the standard assumption that quantification is ontologi-
cally committing, such a reading commits to there being something 
in reality that Hob and Nob’s mental states are about. But such a 
consequence is unwelcome. However, once we sever the link be-
tween quantification and ontological commitment, as Crane does, 
we can give a syntactically de re reading without these unwanted 
consequences along the lines of the following:
(12) Σx (x is a witch) such that Hob thinks that (x is a witch and) x 
blighted Bob’s mare, and  Σy such that Nob wonders whether 
y (a witch) killed Cob’s sow, and x ≈ y,
where the material in parentheses can be included or not depending 
on how exactly we read (11). Two comments. First, ‘x ≈ y’ means 
x is the same as y, to be discussed below. Second, as Nathan Salmon 
(2015) notes, it seems plausible to suggest that ‘witch’ has a reading 
on which it can be truly predicated of mythical witches, and also a 
reading which means something like ‘is a mythical witch or a real 
witch’ (compare ‘gun’ and ‘poet’, in ‘is that gun real or fake’ and 
‘how many poets are there living or buried in Budapest?’ (cf. Par-
tee 2010). If so, Crane can take the occurrence of ‘witch’ outside 
the scope of the propositional attitudes as not committing to real 
witches.
But what of ‘x ≈ y’? Aside from the trivial identity statements 
discussed above, Crane does not allow for true identity statements 
concerning nonexistents, so x ≈ y cannot be treated as x=y. Crane 
(2013: 163-164) suggests that we cash out ‘x ≈ y’ in terms of the 
resemblance of representations: Mercury and Hermes are not liter-
ally identical, but we can say that they are “the same”, by virtue of 
the similarity of the representations of x and y. For some purposes 
this might be right, but I think that often our sameness talk reflects 
more than qualitative similarity. If I say that you and I have the same 
car, what this would ordinarily mean is that we have the same type 
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of car, such as a VW Golf. But being a VW Golf is not (merely) a 
matter of resemblance, for causal links are important too—if your 
car just happens to look like a VW Golf then it is not in fact a VW 
Golf. How however we cash out this talk of types, we cannot em-
ploy the same treatment in the case of nonexistents: nonexistents do 
not fall under any causally-individuated type, since they don’t exist. 
Nevertheless, I think that to account for some of our sameness talk 
concerning the nonexistent, we must appeal to causation, since it 
seems that whether we count fictional characters as being the same 
(from an irrealist perspective) depends on whether the uses of the 
names we use to speak of them are related. If so, it might be help-
ful for Crane to appeal to Sainsbury’s (2005, chapter 3) name-using 
practices, and then to ground (some) sameness talk in terms of caus-
ally related name-using practices along the lines of Salis (2013). But 
as long as Crane has a satisfactory account of ‘x ≈ y’, it seems as if he 
might be well-placed to offer an account of (11).1
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